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Abstract
The article explores the features and charts the principle theorizing of reg-
ulatory sociability from collaboration rather than intervention, whatever 
the interest-based motivation behind transforming crisis, toward orderli-
ness. A key theme is the role played by corporations in facilitating and ben-
efiting from sociability. A particular explanatory focus on the way in which 
corporate culture can change from predatory jurisdiction shopping to em-
bracing mutuality of interests in the context of environmental sustainability 
is employed. The article concludes with a discussion of how, as compulsory 
discipline increases, it may produce compliance but at costs for regula-
tory sociability. The alternative regulatory paradigm is one that moves 
to resolve the antimony between desire (profit) and reason (sustainability) 
in a manner that relies on and endorses the constituents of collaboration. 
Collaborative regulation, the article suggests, can arise out of crisis and be 
justified through desires for orderliness without compulsion. But for col-
laborative regulation to be sustainable, it must complement certain positive 
“orderly” aspects within political economy. The analysis determines some 
observations concerning the shape and shaping of collaborative regulation 
in an atmosphere of more pluralist knowledge-based (disciplinary) engage-
ment involving trust, comity, and sustainability.
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Overview
The article is interested in regulatory sociability as an undervalued mecha-
nism for corporate governance. As developed here, sociability is not a natural 
consequence of protecting the libertarian entitlements (or excesses) of a 
rights-based regulatory environment (individualist or communitarian).1 
Rather, sociability is collaborative relationships which, from a variety of 
motivations, can lead to positive, pluralist regulatory directions (Berman, 
2009). The central theme of this brief analysis of the conditions of regulatory 
sociability is to explore regulatory theories entertaining organic cooperation 
as opposed to mechanical intervention, when progressing from crisis to 
orderliness.2
Collaborative regulation goes further than “interest group” or “capture” 
theories (discussed in detail in Posner, 1974). The argument to follow pro-
gresses the idea that for whatever reason in the context of reactions to crisis 
modified through the particularities of political economy,3 collaborative 
regulation is more than a product of public calls for market correction or the 
particular demands of pressure groups struggling to reconcile the diverse 
preferences of their members.4 Organic collaboration should be viewed as a 
regulatory resolution emerging as a conscious choice away from mechanical 
intervention, both available as possible policy strategies to resolve larger 
political and ideological conflict.5
In the wake of the recent global financial meltdown,6 and the apparent 
failure of the Copenhagen and Cancun climate change talks, questions are 
being asked of conventional global regulatory strategies, particularly those 
wedded to law, regarding even their capacity to appreciate the essential con-
ditions of global crisis (Ayak, 2010). In particular, if an analysis of global 
crisis moves away from concerns about state to corporate responsibility, what 
are the possibilities through collaborative regulation to shift corporate behav-
ior from predatory adaptations of regulatory influence toward embracing 
mutuality and common good? The example of jurisdiction shopping for 
short-term profit gain is juxtaposed against the recognition of medium-term 
market and resource sustainability, when seeking to better engage corporate 
responsibility with environmental protection.
The aim of this summary analysis is to position an intersection between 
crisis theories and political economy to explain an emergent predisposition 
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among critical crisis stakeholders, such as multinational corporations (MNCs) 
exploiting third-world resources, toward collaborative regulation, and thereby 
the conditions of regulatory sociability. For the present purpose, crisis flash 
points in recent political economies, such as environmental sustainability, 
will be taken as given, and their common features will be enunciated. From 
there, the article speculates on the nexus between crisis and political econ-
omy as it motivates cooperative regulatory strategies.
Collaboration is employed beyond ideas of “best practice” (Gunningham & 
Sinclair, 1999) and compliance (creative or otherwise; Black, 1996), although 
both these established regulatory contexts will rely to differing degrees on 
cooperation, convergence, and mutualities of interest. Collaboration is central 
to theories of responsive regulation7 but differs, as I see it, in the essential 
characteristic of emerging common interest (crisis to ordering) within com-
munities of shared risk (crisis disordering).
For the sake of expedience, and so as to confine the analytical focus to 
noncompulsory regulatory forms, cooperation will assume a background in 
prevailing domestic and international polarities of political and economic 
interest.8 Despite the article’s consideration of the active nexus between the 
features of political economy and crisis theories9 in real time, I will not at this 
stage move from theoretical modeling into empirical testing. That is a larger, 
later project.
At an additional level of consideration, the regulatory “crisis” for major 
corporations in resisting mechanical interventionist regulatory strategies 
in favor of self-regulatory social responsibility is critiqued for its capacity 
to exacerbate global disorder in the face of recent and catastrophic eco-
nomic, environmental, and social chaos (Purcell, 2002). If as the article 
argues, the consequences of crisis and the necessities of political econo-
mies (even beyond the jurisdictional considerations of nation states) pro-
mote noncompulsory regulation, then to what extent can regulatory 
discipline be sharpened through the cooperation of compliant above coer-
cive strategies (Ogus, 1995)? Collaboration, more than compulsion, 
depends on the relationships between compliant actors. In the motivations 
driving these actors, we can find a synergy between rationality (sustain-
ability) and desire (profit), which the article sees as fueling cooperative 
and collaborative regulatory situations.
Herein, regulation is toward ordering and orderliness. Such a foundational 
assumption of the regulatory purpose is directed to orderliness for now. Even 
so, orderliness is aspirational and ongoing. In this way, the article’s regula-
tory theorizing recognizes orderliness as present and prescient. It encom-
passes the “ought/is” debate by recognizing the social relativity in asking, 
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“Whose law and what order?” (Chambliss & Mankoff, 1976). Adopting such 
a purpose for the progress from crisis traces ordering along a dynamic con-
tinuum, onto which regulatory strategies locate and operate in different tran-
sitional market and resource contexts.
The order/disorder dichotomy is here replaced by Durkheimian apprecia-
tion of mechanical and organic order (Durkheim, 1893/1997). Organic order 
can be seen as addressing the is to ought transition for regulation and mechan-
ical order, the ought to is. Sociability as both the incentive for and outcome 
of a transition from crisis to orderliness is a present consideration in collab-
orative regulatory relationships and a future aspiration for the maintenance of 
reciprocal regulatory interests. Regular order, as is and ought to be, is the 
dynamic context of comity wherein a commonality of interest can be forged 
and sustained.
The article suggests that unbridled corporate self-interest driving short-
term environmental resource degradation is disorderly for market and resource 
sustainability. When the major corporations involved in such short-term profit 
rush are exposed, along with the natural environment and its dependent stake-
holders, to joining in communities of shared risk and shared fate, the potential 
for medium-term mutualities of interest (general interest—common good) 
fueling positive regulatory collaboration is increased.
The social comity (Uslauner, 1991) essential to progress crisis to orderli-
ness, I argue, results from appropriate regulation emerging through regulatory 
“collaboration” more effectively than disciplinary regulation. Nonconsensual, 
imposed, or mechanical regulation works from a state of resistant and “trust-
less” disorder, and the propensity to strain orderliness. Collaboration, on the 
other hand, has order at its essence, even if only at the level of reluctant or 
superficial comity. So saying, the article recognizes that disciplinary regulation 
has a declaratory and moral dimension (Sunstein, 1990a), and from this can 
flow collaborative possibilities. Where the following analysis diverges from 
disciplinary regulation is in the motivation to approach orderliness in the first 
place, common good operating in communities of shared risk.
That said, by looking behind the theme of general interest10 (and reflect-
ing on compatible reasons for regulation and governance), the article tests the 
appearance of comity and the altruism of collaboration. It is suggested that 
compromise drives collaboration and dominant interests strike compromise. 
This sets up a realist and skeptical understanding of regulatory collaboration 
within the tensions and contradictions of crisis (global catastrophe), and 
toward orderliness (stabilizing political economy).
Regulatory sociability depends on the orderliness of civil society or 
global community.11 An orderly or harmonious social world is not ensured 
by balancing antimonies of self-interest or shared value (Vincent-Jones, 
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2002), where such claims are normative at best and illusory at least (Gabel 
& Kennedy, 1984).
Order can be reconciled with freedom only through interpersonal rules 
that embody more than the values of a single person. Consequently, 
rules must be separated from values to avoid the appearance that they 
are only the “social face of desire” (Kennedy, 1981). But the antimony 
between rules and values gives rise to social paradoxes that are as trou-
bling as those that the antimony between reason and desire generates 
on the psychological level. (Hutchinson & Monahan, 1984, p. 1495)
The article works its way through the features and theorizing of regula-
tory sociability from collaboration rather than intervention, whatever be the 
interest-based motivation within crisis and toward orderliness. I argue that 
as compulsory discipline increases, it may produce compliance but at costs 
for regulatory sociability. The alternative regulatory paradigm is one that moves 
to resolve the antimony between desire (profit) and reason (sustainability) in 
a manner that relies on and endorses the constituents of collaboration.
Collaborative regulation, the article suggests, can arise out of crisis and be 
justified through desires for orderliness without compulsion. But for collab-
orative regulation to be sustainable, it must complement certain positive 
“orderly” aspects within political economy (Purcell, 2002). The analysis 
determines some observations concerning the shape and shaping of collab-
orative regulation in an atmosphere of more pluralist knowledge-based (dis-
ciplinary) engagement.
Sociability—More Than Responsive Regulation12
For the purposes of an analysis that looks at regulation in the context of socia-
bility, corporate interest management as a challenge to sociability is crucial if 
we are to trace the progress from global market and resource crisis to ordering 
through environmental sustainability. By locating regulatory strategies within 
specific political economies, it is possible to provide some predictive potential 
regarding such a trend, with a variety of crucial sociopolitical and economic 
variables held constant. Moving from crisis to orderliness within specific 
political economy contextualization marginalizes a single event focus (such as 
corporate commerce = global warming) when evaluating regulatory effi-
ciency, and encourages consideration of the manner in which multiple vari-
ants influence and are influenced by a chosen regulatory strategy. Cooperation 
in regulatory challenges and outcomes relies on the multiple social and mar-
ket variables that transform self into general interest.
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Cooperation is facilitated but not forced by rules. Noncooperative theory 
is intimately concerned with processes and rules defining the game. 
Cooperative theory operates away from such rules and looks only at more 
general descriptions that specify what each coalition can obtain. As such, 
cooperative game theory is not intimately concerned with processes and 
rules. Rather, it specifies what each regulatory coalition might achieve, as 
opposed to how they will achieve beyond cooperation. Rules as legitimating 
compulsory (and often external) intervention are eschewed in a collaborative 
regulatory model. Rules that enable the foundation and perpetuation of game 
conditions for collaboration, however, are desired.
The discourse of regulation within a game theory frame is a significant 
variable when advancing collaboration instead of compulsion:
The constitution of discourse represents a process which is struggled 
over, and at the same time it forms “spaces” and “rules of the game,” 
in and according to which conflicts are settled. Discourses have effects 
on power when they become institutionalized, are linked to action and 
become carriers of valid knowledge (Link, 1983, p. 60). Discourses are 
hegemonic when they become the “historical-organic ideology” 
(Antonio Gramsci) of ruling actors, who in this way gain consent in 
society for their particular interests (usually by making concessions 
and compromises). Of course, this cannot just be manufactured by 
elites but must have a material basis in society. This process is part of 
complex struggles and their institutionalization over societal regula-
tion. (Baskerville, 2007, p. 3)
Discourse essential in a collaborative regulatory environment is conver-
sation more than dialogue, conversation providing a crucial language on 
which to found sociability. As will be advanced in more detail after the dis-
cussion of interest management in the context of environmental sustainabil-
ity, sociability implies trust, respect, conditions of comity, and cooperative 
relationships of friendship. These relationships are responsive to, and foster, 
orderliness from chaos at domestic, regional, and international levels of 
political economy. Regulatory strategies compatible with effective friend-
ship relationships, the article argues, are likely to be pluralist rather than 
dependent on state-centered solidarism. From the pluralist perspective, sus-
taining order in a diverse international system lacking solidarity requires 
emphasizing the importance of international rules and norms in reason-
guided action. Even so, the more the rules are removed from the constitu-
tional legality of particular political economy, the more they rely on goodwill 
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for compliance. But pluralism may underestimate the scope of reasons avail-
able for international cooperation even as it may correctly point to the risks 
to international legal norms that those expanded reasons for cooperation 
(even among friends) may create.
The solidarism implied by international friendship is likely, when it comes 
to resource exploitation, to be parsimonious. It does not necessarily extend to 
the whole of international society, and certainly not to global commercial 
interests, and hence may be viewed with suspicion by those who hope to 
bring together the international community of states into a greater solidarity 
in pursuit of global orderliness through resource and market sustainability. 
Friendship itself provides a set of reasons that can have standing in regulatory 
decision making. These reasons do not necessarily trump reasons of narrow 
self-interest, human rights, international solidarity, or international law, but 
they are reasons that go some way to explaining regulatory preference for 
collaboration rather than solidarist prescription.
Perhaps a manageable place to start efforts at reconciliation between reg-
ulatory prescription and collaboration when addressing environmental sus-
tainability is with the capitalist view of nature as a resource rather than a 
delicate and diminished responsibility—neither limitless nor expendable. To 
achieve corporate social responsibility (CSR) as an active constituent in 
environmental protection, a fundamental shift in self-interested opinion can-
not be produced in moral terms alone. The transition will need talking 
through in economic language and by moving the commercial depth of field 
from short-term profit to medium-term market sustainability. Only then can 
private preferences for environmental goods be adapted to existing environ-
mental options through explaining social demand for environmental regula-
tion and impeaching purely economic preferences that otherwise input into 
environmental regulatory policy (Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999).
Ayers and Braithwaite (1992) argue that there is no useful separation 
between public and private interests in theorizing regulation.
Social life seems “almost always to involve a combination of pecuni-
ary interest-pursuit and citizenship.” In practical terms, citizen con-
cerns about themselves motivate their identification of public concerns: 
“reason is most likely to be applied by passion—in the form of inter-
ests.” This is not to support the “crude deals” thesis that one sometimes 
sees in law and economics writing. Regulation is largely contested in 
a public-regarding discourse; it is a shallow analysis to view interest 
groups as unashamedly using the state regulatory apparatus as no more 
than a vehicle for advancing their private interests . . . Achieving 
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regulatory effectiveness through a balance of control is not about simply 
striking a compromise of interests. It is about understanding each other’s 
needs and then sharing ideas in the pursuit of risk management strategies 
that deliver acceptable protection at an acceptable cost. (p. 59)
Order and Regulation13—Playing the Game14
Putting regulation somewhere in a transition toward ordering (and the out-
come of orderliness) intends to break down the dialectic of market and 
resource order/disorder. Having said this, the orderliness imperative of regu-
lation depends on understanding and tackling what constitutes disorder. 
Misunderstanding the incremental nature of orderliness in favor of a simple 
dichotomous approach is central to why many compulsory (command and 
control) regulatory expressions fail or underperform. It is unhelpful to work 
in the shadow of this order dialectic if theorizing is to concern itself with the 
forms and sources of regulatory choice toward states of orderliness. Rather 
than order/disorder, it is more helpful to view regulatory options as progress-
ing on a continuum from crisis (chaos) to orderliness.
The need to regulate order out of chaos is a perennial consideration in 
global regulatory convergence and coexistence. However, the contextual 
contingency of regulatory strategies both directed at chaos and order has lead 
to the rich theorizing on “the game” as a regulatory choice frame. The game 
can be the metaphor for contextual contingency and at the same time com-
mon rules of the game can enable some universal analytical considerations 
that are not constantly derailed in contextual relativity.
Collaboration, I argue, diminishes
 • principal/agent control problems and
 • collective action problems associated with any implementation 
strategy,
which can lead regulatory policy beneficiaries to oppose other effective 
but intrusive implementation strategies in the broader sociopolitical games.
Issues of political economy may construct the preferred choices of princi-
pal and collective game players so that they act out of self-interest, and thereby 
sometimes against the effectiveness of collaborative regulation and imple-
mentation policies. As with our contextual location of sociability, game theory 
transposed into regulatory policy choices essentially requires political econ-
omy location. Brand suggests these in a contemporary sense as different 
phases of bourgeois-capitalist socialization. He sees any of these phases in a 
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heuristic way to indicate from a regulationist perspective the contradictory 
and, on a more concrete level, the diverse transformation of capitalism toward 
a new phase of political economy (Brand, 2005). Regulatory discourse, there-
fore, as a language “for sorting complex societal relations, makes them plau-
sible and serves as a point of orientation for political action” (Brand, 2005, 
p. 156). The “game” of bourgeois-capitalist economy (Fordist politics), Brand 
suggests, is now subject to the political reregulation of economic globaliza-
tion, seen wherein certain developments and reasons for them are unavoid-
able and legitimate, and other concepts of societal development are pushed 
aside or rendered implausible in view of the dominant patterns of sociability. 
The emergent trend toward collaborative regulation in the global banking 
sector, for instance, in response to impending increased state regulation 
following the recent global financial meltdown (or any boom and bust cycle 
for that matter) is evidence of new rules in a previously deregulated game. As 
Brand concedes, such regulatory transition may not adequately be viewed 
through discourse analysis alone. It is more than all talk.
Even if it is plausible that there is no meaningful reality for actors 
outside of discourses, relatively “independent” structures exist which 
are reproduced through actions and, at the same time, are very diffi-
cult to change for the actors. Structures are a theoretical construction, 
but—without grasping reality in full—they point to “corridors” for 
action in the sense of restrictions and opportunities which are beyond 
non-theoretical discursive practices. The opportunities of certain 
forms of action to establish themselves are clearly less at certain 
times, or even non-existent. . . . According to this (historical material-
ist) concept, in bourgeois-capitalist societies structural principles such 
as the separation of the political and the economic, wage labour and 
the private ownership of the means of production take effect which 
are more deeply anchored than explicit norms. From a historical-
materialist point of view it is therefore a question of more than simply 
inter-subjectivity and communicative action because communication 
about the fundamental structures of bourgeois-capitalist socialization 
usually does not take place. (Brand, 2005, pp. 157-158)
Participatory regulatory governance serves as a framework to deal with 
crises in political economy and to make their management more effective. 
Brand reflects that even post-Fordist politics is based on relationships of 
compulsion and coercion. The procedures of representative democracy are 
rescinded at the global level. The global system is directed and regulated by 
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oligarchical power structures that tend to merge into ever more efficient and 
better integrated networks that circumvent nation state governments (Group 
of Lisbon States, 1997). Global governance discourse on problem-solving 
and order-creating political regulation seems detached from the prevailing 
deregulated/semiregulated economic discourses around competition. 
Successful economic politics breaks down regulatory barriers to improve the 
conditions for the utilization of capital. Global order, in contrast, is seen as 
the product of interventionist regulatory securitization. Herein lies a central 
contradiction within the global regulatory game.
Teleologies of Regulation and  
Crisis—Evolutionary Mechanisms
Brand argues that the dynamic transformation of international politics (with 
crisis to ordering as a central governance concern) can be understood very 
well through regulatory theory. In doing so, he exercises the notion of con-
tradiction. Chaos theorizing, where crisis is a critical transformation point, 
employs contradiction that, I suggest, ranges between regulatory order and 
deregulated disorder.
Crisis not only fuels choices for reestablishing order but can also give 
meaning to the regulatory methodology preferred for ordering. Crisis can be 
viewed as cathartic, as occurring for a purpose and giving purpose to its 
response. The purposes behind crisis-led regulation ultimately precipitate 
resolution through the progress to ordering. In this way, crisis states are 
temporal, contradictory, and self-defeating, but essential to the rejuvenation 
of ordering.
Crisis as the antimony of ordering is determined against the conditions of 
chaos theory. Chaos theory takes its root in the study of nonlinear dynamic 
systems.15 The interests of economists and physical scientists in such dynam-
ics have been mainly stimulated by these systems’ capabilities in represent-
ing what were previously perceived as noise and randomness.16 Much of the 
work done of this type focuses on regularity, equilibrium, stability, and pre-
dictability, rather than the apparent unexplainable, the complex, the “stable–
unstable.” Therefore, the study of chaos is as much a theory of ordering and 
its realization out of chaos. Chaos itself is studied to reveal potentials for 
ordering rather than the uncertainty of disorder. In attempting to transform 
predatory corporate exploitation of natural resources (chaos for markets and 
resources in the medium term) into corporately responsible mutualities of 
interest, it is necessary to explore the motivations for self-interest and the 
impediments to collaborative regulation, which are in the medium term 
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socially and economically chaotic. Regarding what they determine to be 
interest-based regulation, Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (2010) observe,
Despite growing international environmental interdependence, the 
international system lacks a central authority to foster environmental 
protection. As a consequence, countries have adopted different poli-
cies to reduce international environmental problems. More specifi-
cally, costly regulations are not universally supported. In order to 
explain the success and failure of international environmental regula-
tion, it is necessary to systematically focus on the factors that shape 
the environmental foreign policy of sovereign states. Since such an 
approach is missing from the literature, we develop an interest-based 
explanation of support for international environmental regulation and 
postulate what impact it should have on state preferences for interna-
tional environmental regulation. (p. 78)
These authors advocate the prospect for environmental sustainability of 
international environmental interdependence. To stimulate this position, they 
explore an interest-based approach to international environmental regulation 
as a partial but parsimonious view of how a country’s preferences for interna-
tional environmental regulation are shaped.
The interest-based explanation of the international politics of environ-
mental management focuses on those domestic factors that shape a 
country’s position in international environmental negotiations. In 
other words, the interest-based explanation is a unit-level explanation 
of international relations. Unit-level explanations refer to elements 
located at the national or sub-national levels, whereas systemic expla-
nations suggest that differences at the unit level produce less variation 
in outcomes than one would expect in the absence of systemic con-
straints. While unit-level explanations emphasize the varying charac-
teristics of countries, systemic theories suggest that countries with 
different internal characteristics tend to behave in the same way if 
they are similarly positioned in the international system. (Sprinz 
&Vaahtoranta, 2010, p. 78)
Approaching questions of internationalization from the domestic focus 
might present an analytical constraint in itself. That noted, the authors see a 
pragmatic and interest-based correlation between environmental vulnerabil-
ity and abatement costs.
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In addition to these mass political pressures on national governments, a 
differentiated industry pressure model could be developed. By explic-
itly linking abatement costs and international trade in environmental 
technologies, on the one hand, to the interests of major polluting indus-
tries and the abatement technology sector, on the other hand, a differen-
tiated model of industry support for international environmental 
regulation can be developed. (Sprinz &Vaahtoranta, 2010, p. 104)
What must be done therefore to transform parsimonious interest into an 
atmosphere of collaborative international interdependence?
 • The absence of a central governance authority to foster environmen-
tal protection at the global level means that interdependency cannot 
rely on the mechanical coordination that state agencies offer at the 
nation state level—Diverse and unconnected national approaches 
add to the difficulty of connecting and networking.
 • The factors that shape the environmental foreign policy of sovereign 
states need adaptation so as to recognize the importance of trans-
forming self-interest into mutualities of interest at a variety of net-
worked levels.
 • The reconstitution of what is difference and what is a mutual 
approach recognizing different sources—Is it about difference at 
state and substate levels or about similarity in the behavior of differ-
ent characteristics when the positioning of interests is similar at the 
international level?
 • Interdependence is not to be confused with dependency. Interde-
pendence implies moving from positions of legitimate self-interest, 
beyond negotiation theory where parties are fundamentally differ-
ent in the power they bring to the table—Internationally, this may 
require political and economic compensation for weaker players 
based on (a) a country’s ecological vulnerability to pollution and (b) 
the economic costs of pollution abatement.
 • Is the assumption that states are self-interested and rationally weigh 
sustainability in terms of domestic measures of cost/benefit intrac-
table and in what circumstances?—Parsimony rules?
A route to converting parsimony into mutuality is to interrogate global sup-
ply chains and expose the key medium-term considerations for resource and 
market sustainability, and the way in which these depend on productive inter-
national interdependency. To this end, the following features are important:
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 • pressure for responsibility from nongovernmental actors
 • concerns about the ability of states to regulate these firms’ environ-
mental conduct in the global economy
 • nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) extending their reach into 
global supply chains
 • international voluntary environmental initiatives as a realistic 
approach to self-regulation where there is a regulatory voice at state 
and supranational levels
 • enhancement of firms’ capacity to address environmental issues, 
and their strategic importance to the firm and to its community
 • manifestation of real regulatory commitment rather than just the 
preemption of higher regulatory threat
With these considerations in mind, “What are the prospects for ‘trading’ in 
favor of environmental sustainability within international networks of depen-
dency?” Productive trading will be effected by
 • the background of bitter social disputes driven by conflicting inter-
ests, values, and discourses
 • the reengineering social values above profit—industrial health and 
safety as an example
 • expanding the reflexivity of the contractual package—flexible par-
ticipation procedures for extracontractual community
 • overcoming the technocratic orientation of ecomanagement—to 
recognize the external community as parties to business “deal” due 
to their carriage of environmental risk
 • promoting commensurability between environmental quality and 
the things against which this good must be traded off—Can the 
value of environmental and other goods be assessed on the same 
metric?
Ultimately, productive interdependency moving toward mutualizing self-
interest depends on significant changes in value preferences:
 • The vigorous promotion of postmaterialist values wherein the 
domestic interest representation of mass political attitudes is orches-
trated as a medium-term sustainability commitment.
 • Redirecting industrial lobbying away from profit and toward 
sustainability—Resource rationing becomes justified in terms of 
 at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on March 5, 2016aas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
14  Administration & Society XX(X)
the protection of medium-term market trade. This transformation 
is not necessarily state dependent and can be promoted through a 
differentiated industry pressure model, linking abatement costs and 
international trade in environmental technology to major polluters 
and the abatement technology sector.
 • But how do any of these initiatives counter status quo bias? How 
can they be represented as being beyond welfare economics and its 
recent negative connotations in neoliberal democracies? Or elec-
toral self-interest of legislators? Or unenforceability? The answer 
to these reservations lies in a conscious qualification on rational 
actor model, a qualification that exposes the negative imperative of 
a choice restrictions underlying the celebration of rampant self-interest. 
In this respect, market and resource preferences are endogenous 
to existing legal policy if it focuses only on sustaining the limited 
private rights of commercial parties outside the general interests of 
civil society at large.
Having set the scene for the growth of mutualizing interdependencies 
beyond the nation state, the next consideration is locating responsibilities for 
these interdependencies back within crisis-centers such as polluting com-
mercial and industrial concerns. What mechanisms can be employed to 
heighten responsibility within the interests of key adversaries of the sustain-
ability frame?
CSR—Turning Self-Interest Into Common Good
CSR needs to be considered against the view that as an economy grows, it 
will experience negative economic conditions, Kuznets theory. In this con-
text, large commercial interests will construct with the compromised leaders 
of fragmented states relationships of power and dependency, which become 
an essential and unfortunate backdrop for the development of CSR programs. 
Kuznets theory (Stern, 1996) predicts that at the start of the development 
cycle, the country will experience environmental degradation. However, as 
development and wealth increase, the environment will become of greater 
importance, and steps will then be made to reduce the damage caused 
through unbridled modernization and resource development (Barbier, 1997). 
That said, with the explosion of MNCs investing in developing economies, 
the speed at which the environmental damage is occurring has accelerated, 
and by the time environmental control becomes important within a nation, 
the damage may be irreversible (Gonzales, 2001).
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A failing in the reality of CSR has been the commercial habit of major 
MNCs to jurisdiction shop so as to avoid the bite of domestic regulatory 
force, and to maximize their capacity to pressure weak nation states for favor-
able commercial terms against their capacity to pollute and to exploit natural 
resources. This alliance is exacerbated by corrupt relationships between 
MNCs and political leaders in the developing world, which not only conceals 
from the general population the extent of the depletion of their natural envi-
ronment but also keeps to the few the commercial benefits of such exploita-
tion. On top of this, shows of CSR can be critically evaluated for the cynical 
trade-offs that they offer to further mask the destructive outcomes of corpo-
rate greed and political self-interest.
The response to greater globalized networks of responsibility that 
Christmann and Taylor (2001) identify as turning the tide away from third-
world resource exploitation toward responsible sustainability remains 
patchy in some areas of greatest economic dependency and strongest profit 
motivation (such as oil exploration and repatriation). Despite continued 
evidence that some MNCs are damaging the environment (using jurisdic-
tion shopping to do so), there is a lack of concerted global action to correct 
and stop the damage (Christie & Jarvis, 2001). CSR programs only seem to 
emerge in such circumstances where the heat on the company is too strong 
to avoid.
Despite the broadcast positives, CSR has attracted a great deal of criticism 
with many arguing that in the developing world markets and environmental 
contexts, it is simply a case of “greenwashing,” setting minimal standards to 
prevent costly backlash from consumers (Watts, 2005). Furthermore, some 
argue that CSR is simply a method that companies use routinely and inexpen-
sively to prevent the implementation of international regulation (Watts, 2005).
CSR is increasingly promoted as an instrument for global governance to 
address the regulatory vacuum surrounding transnational business activities, 
while encouraging business to contribute to sustainable development at the 
national level. It is important to remember, however, that CSR no longer 
remains the province of business alone. In recent times, a variety of govern-
mental and multilateral institutions have developed CSR perspectives for 
their own activities. Because the sociopolitical model underlying CSR as a 
product of American business is anything but neutral, Gjolberg (2010) identi-
fies different typologies for CSR’s in distinct administrative contexts. Her 
analysis suggests,
Pre-existing political-economic institutions and cultural norms deeply 
affect the interpretation of CSR, and that this, when combined with 
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on-going national political processes, leads to a highly transformed 
concept of CSR. (Gjolberg, 2010, p. 2003)
one in which a much more collaborative and inclusive sharing of respon-
sibility is possible.
CSR can, if effectively pursued in atmospheres of trust, create safe spaces 
within which public–private linkages are forged, with sustainability at their 
heart.
Public–Private Linkages to Regulate 
Environmental Conflict
Perez rejects the “simple binary story” when it comes to interest amalgama-
tion, which he suggests are kept apart through “multiple dilemmas-
constituted and negotiated by a myriad of institutional and discursive 
discourses” (Perez, 2002, p. 78). The remedy he proposes is by a selective 
collapsing of public/private legal sectioning through a method of global 
legal pluralism where the assumed “trade and environment” conflict is 
reconstructed and governed by multiple systems of law rather than any 
single system (Perez, 2002).
Perez represents the modern built environment as a context of highly con-
textualized activity, currently mechanically webbed into ecological and social 
location. He sees this embededness as highly incongruent with the image of 
an isolated business relationship due to what he suggests as a stylized and 
underproductive division between the world of private contracting parties, 
and the wider environmental community excluded from but necessarily 
effected by contractual rights. If it is possible to externalize the environmen-
tal cost of the impact of contractual rights onto the extracontractual commu-
nity, “How can this evidence anything but law’s blindness to its wider 
function in protecting the mutual essence of human existence?”
A purely economic view of this narrow contextual division is that law is 
used as an economic tool to enhance the economic value of business deals for 
private contracting parties. In this interpretation, law fails more than just by 
ignoring community impact; it encourages parties to allocate environmental 
risk to the external community without economic consequences.
This private/public law distinction is particularly dangerous in political 
contexts where the regulatory level is low and public participation is scarce. 
As we have seen with the predatory activities of MNCs in resource-rich and 
regulation-poor states, private legal relationships mask corruption and exploi-
tation, whereas effected communities exist excluded from legal claim. Trust 
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cannot emerge as a force for mutualizing self-interest where law maintains 
boundaries to discriminate private rights from collective responsibilities.
Trust17 and Friendship as Conditions of 
Orderliness Away From Chaos
The progress of chaos to orderliness, particularly in an economic context, 
needs motivation from either general or specific interest (self or mutual). The 
causal nexus between crisis and ordering, facilitated by cooperation rather 
than managed by intervention, is nicely understood within the relative as 
opposed to absolute gains debate. This is a debate that also interrogates (and 
some might say invigorates) the friendship bonds that might otherwise be 
suspect in regulatory environments where crisis at least grew from competi-
tive distortion, excess, and operational suspicion. Friendship paradigms are 
particularly apposite for non-state-centered regulatory domains.
The idea of “communities of shared risk” and “shared fate” is proposed as 
a foundational context wherein common interest replaces self-interest, and 
absolute rather than relative gains prevail. For instance, the recent shift to 
medium-term sustainability and away from short-term profit is the explana-
tion for a growth in “de-materialist” corporate decision making when mega-
corporations realize the expendability of say fossil fuels in the wider context 
of environmental degradation. This trend is evidence of sociability against 
previous competitive market positioning and immediate self-interest.
The aim of a regulatory strategy such as collaborative sociability designed 
on the dynamic mechanisms of trust engenders greater compliance through 
the development of confidence and obligation in preferring conditions of 
sociability. Such a strategy evolves from a consequentialist theory preferring 
goal maximization as a trust-based strategy where the goal becomes maxi-
mum adherence to regulatory standards.
Rather than constraining the regulatory game, as is the habit of external 
coercive strategies, a trust-based approach enables regulatory models to be 
designed around more dynamic and innovative frameworks where networks 
of regulatory conversation predominate in a global setting. The trust infused 
regulatory preference can shift between praise and punishment, regulation 
and self-regulation, and citizenship and self-interest where virtue is nur-
tured, and its failure is met with a closure of cooperative pathways 
(Braithwaite, 2008).
Trust-based regulation can be wrongly dismissed as model or utopian. If 
dispositions of trust are proposed and analyzed outside particular political 
economies, then trust can regress into the realm of normative aspiration and 
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the collaborative outcomes of trust atmospheres are lost as mechanisms of 
regulatory force. Trust-based regulatory strategies in practice and action pro-
vide scope for realizing the rewards of collaborative regulation, chaos to 
orderliness, in a far more sustainable fashion than through external compul-
sory intervention.
Trust as a regulatory context need not be disempowered as utopian or 
purely aspirational. Conditions fostering trust are measurable and opera-
tional. These conditions are not only relative to political economy but are 
also extractable in more universalized expressive and facilitative forms. 
Evaluating conditions for maximizing or diminishing trust, even so, need to 
be understood within particular temporal and spatial situations of political 
economy. The recent emergence of a discourse of collaboration in the global 
banking sector has its roots in empirically measurable financial stress, and 
the “trust” essentials for this discourse are equally open to material measure-
ment and evaluation.
Obviously, total trust environments remove the need for regulation. 
However, trust is a dynamic social state. Trust maintenance and collabora-
tive sociability may require reenforcement through regulation, preferably 
internal to that relationship and hence co-opted to the restoration of trust. 
Cooperative rather than interventionist and prescriptive regulation is more 
naturally aligned with and fostered within organic rather than mechanical 
conditions of trust. In the following section, the article explores expressive 
and facilitative relationships from trust to pluralist regulation.
Cooperation or Contingent Necessity?
Whether cooperative regulation emerges organically out of the smoke of 
crisis or is accepted reluctantly as the preferred alternative to mechanical 
regulation, the cooperative partners will to differing degrees dabble in trust.
The threat and use of the legal apparatus within the regulatory environ-
ment can be counterproductive for generating sustainable atmospheres of 
trust, even though pending legal sanctioning can give strength to the bound-
aries within which trust flourishes in safety. The most productive way to 
achieve genuine acceptance of, and adherence to, regulation is not by an 
exclusive or regular punitive reliance on legal coercion but rather through 
the use of strategies that attempt to bring out best practice and creative com-
pliance responses from dependent agencies by nurturing virtue or the capac-
ity for good.18
Rather than regarding regulation as a zero-sum game with compliance 
only being motivated through rewards or punishments, regulatory encounters 
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are more sustainably and less confrontationally conceptualized as dynamic 
relationships demanding flexible strategies that recognize the existence of a 
range of motivational diversity in adhering to regulatory demands. Generating 
the responsibilities of citizenship to sociability rather than exclusion through 
sanction fosters the internalization of regulatory objectives and increases vol-
untary compliance.
Collaborative regulatory theory appreciates and confirms the productive 
capacity and dynamic nature of basing regulatory encounters on trust rela-
tionships, an approach that secures compliance by eschewing threat, and 
training dependent agencies to value, maximize, and exploit trustworthy 
capacities. The regulated and the regulators coexist within an interdependent 
milieu but can often demand opposing regulatory outcomes. Therefore, inter-
dependent mechanisms by which mutually cooperative interventions can be 
injected into the regulatory environment should within atmospheres of trust 
replace the choice of sanction-focused interventions for ordering away from 
chaos. Preceding atmospheres of trust that support collaborative regulation, it 
becomes essential for theory to explain the dynamics of trust relationships in 
particular environments as well as their erosion.
Sociability depends on trust forming a constituent part of social, eco-
nomic, and political relationships that allow for regularity, predictability, and 
continuity in orderly, not chaotic, relationships. Paradoxically, risk is an 
essential feature of trust relationships, in the same way that crisis and chaos 
are crucial for the recursive understanding of processes to orderliness. In 
bestowing trust, the choice to trust is a discretion based on subjective assess-
ments and presumptions that another dependent agent will act in a particular 
way in the future that is not at least contrary to the initiator’s own interest. It 
is expected that the trustee will act in the interest of the trustor, without direct 
coercion to act in the desired way. However, trust relationships have sym-
metrical and asymmetrical constituents, the former being trust as confidence, 
relating to internalized human expectations, that arise from intellectual and 
emotional understandings or beliefs that the natural, social, or moral order 
will persist, be stable, and predictable. This conception of trust is based on 
notions of positive intent, goodwill, and sociability toward civil society. 
Asymmetrical trust relationships are due to power differentials grounded in 
knowledge and expertise, with the expectation that the expertise and knowl-
edge will be used in a technically competent manner. These are the sorts of 
professional ethics that can be termed trust as obligation, relating to the 
undertaking of fidelity whereby one regards others in a relationship as having 
ideal obligations and responsibilities to demonstrate and place the interest of 
the weaker party (the trustor) above his or her own (the trustee).
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Luhmann19 argues that the delegation of trust is particularly functional in 
modem societies, because due to their complexity it is impossible to develop 
actions or plans that take into account all possible contingent futures. He 
states,
Without trust only the very simple forms of human cooperation which 
can be transacted on the spot are possible, and even individual action 
is much too sensitive to disruption to be capable of being planned, 
without trust, beyond the immediately assured moment.
Sanction-based and external compulsory regulation cannot entirely replace 
any degree of trust because total enforcement is unachievable. A complete 
absence of trust would not even allow for the formulation of distrust in a 
direction on which action can be based, for this would force one to presup-
pose trust in another direction. Trust is functional in the sense that by invest-
ing in it, we can motivate others to do likewise and create the conditions 
under which greater productive relationships can be achieved. Essential for 
the resilience of these conditions is the collaborative modification and com-
promise of specific interests toward the general interest of sociability.
General Interest of Global Sociability
Brand sees the issue at stake in global governance and regulation as general 
interest.
That this general interest is always a societal construction as the result 
of social conflicts and the formation of compromises, will hardly be 
disputed. At the same time in most of the contributions on global gov-
ernance this fact that this is constructed is not scrutinized further.
In an effort to advance such scrutiny, Brand offers an analysis of condi-
tions for general interest that may promote and consolidate collaborative 
regulation globally.
There are three ways in which this (general interest) is related to 
dominant perspectives: the state can in this way become the embodi-
ment of precisely this general interest, which provides the reason for 
the necessity of the ability of the state to exercise control. The question 
as to the concrete processes and the subject-matter of state politics can 
safely be put aside because as the expression of the general interest it 
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a priori does not need a reason. Secondly, societal conflicts can be 
represented here as basically reconcilable or—politically more 
pointed—certain political self-images and strategies can be delegiti-
mized. And finally, a general interest of “world society” is formulated 
largely from the perspective of the “OECD world,” which not only 
knows where the problems lie but also has available the means to deal 
with them. (explicitly the Group of Lisbon, 1997, p. 27)
Brand goes on to suggest that the sponsorship of general interest by state 
regulatory capacity can lead to tension or crisis:
A remarkable tension arises here: “World society’s” general interest in 
political cooperation is not at all seen as being in conflict with 
“national interests,” which are in part quite different from the former. 
In national societies, it has become the general interest to be competi-
tive as a location vis-à-vis other societies.
But the competitive nation state advocating a general regulatory interest in 
economic deregulation may not complement the general interest of global 
communities that seek solutions to world problems through a collaborative 
rather than a competitive approach to political and economic relations.
From my perspective, this paradox between cooperation and competi-
tion is solved in the following way. The above described essentializing 
and inviolability of the economic will make it possible to regard political 
cooperation as the “solution to world problems” as not being in open 
contradiction to the competition among locations, capital and labor, and 
the safeguarding of them by the competition state and by global.
Therefore, the imperative for individual political economy may be com-
petitive, whereas the approach to global problems is cooperative without 
challenge to either regulatory milieu provided the latter has the appearance of 
normative or ideological neutrality.
A general interest in cooperative solutions to obvious problems with 
which everybody is faced to the same extent is formulated in which 
capitalist competition is no longer seen as a problem but exists as 
something more or less natural. Precisely, due to this ignoring of vari-
ous aspects, it is possible to organize certain consensuses in post-
Fordism. This is not at all new: The various forces in society always 
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struggle for the generalization of their specific interests. What has 
changed, however, is the concrete historical forms in which this takes 
place. The actors themselves are more or less aware—usually much 
more strongly than the social sciences that reflect on them—that they 
cannot establish their interests completely but must be prepared to 
make compromises.
At this point, Brand proposes the essential underpinning of general inter-
est as it is seen in the context of global governance: compromise. The same 
can be said of global regulation in a collaborative vein. What remains is to 
chart the achievement of collaboration through compromise in particular 
transitions from crisis to orderliness in specific political economies.
Some “truths” seem to be unquestionable: that globalization is 
untouchable in its (economic) core which means the fundamental 
shift of power relations, a concept of politics which refers to coop-
eration and realpolitik. With this, world problems which seem to 
affect all people can be resolved. The discourse is so attractive 
because it contributes to the generalization of dominant interests. 
(Brand, 2005, pp. 168-169)
Common interest pushing and enjoying regulatory collaboration, arising 
mechanically out of compromise, crafted organically from dominant interest: 
as the reality of global governance.
Political Economy and Global  
Community—Necessary Simplicities
Economic and political realities in nominated political contexts mediate the 
reasons for the crisis and the imperatives for regulation. They also incubate 
dominant interest, and negotiate protective and beneficial compromise as a 
precondition for cooperation.
Whether organic or mechanical in origin and operation, regulatory alter-
natives work best in an atmosphere approaching equality of arms (or mini-
mum justice). By this, I am not suggesting that the fundamental contractual 
myth of parity in standing is necessary among and between parties facing the 
need to regulate crisis to order. However, comity is a key contextual feature 
for regulation serviced by trust, imbuing friendship and giving legitimacy to 
game choice and differential value.
Choice and capacities to choose are dependent on conditions of comity 
(as suggested above) that promote rather than distract from sociability. 
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“Comity”20 is more than simply being nice to one another. It requires a 
certain degree of manners within conventional compliance. Manners are 
conventions, and conventional compliance requires respect for “laws and 
usages” in an exchange of reciprocity within conventions. Against the civil-
ity of conventions are rules for achieving and regulating comity.
However, comity as a reason for regulatory collaboration may be as miscon-
strued as the simple causal assumption that private sector interests cooperate to 
self-regulate to stave off impending interventionist and compulsory state regu-
lation. Collaboration, masquerading comity rather that compromise reflecting 
dominant self-interest, can also benefit from the legitimacy of organic rather 
than mechanical origination. In addition, the allusion of comity gains credibil-
ity from its natural alignment with regulatory socialization.
Brand suggests (in similar terms for global governance) that it is hege-
mony rather than harmony at the heart of collaborative alliances:
Finally, one important question remains, namely whether Global 
Governance opens up opportunities for a new, higher evaluation of 
societal processes (cf. e.g. Ruppert, 2000, p. 56). This cannot be 
decided abstractly. As a counterpoint to US unilateralism it is cer-
tainly possible and currently urgently necessary. And at the fringes, 
too, more critical positions can emerge, as the feminist debate for 
example has shown. How far Global Governance will become a 
hegemonic discourse depends not only on the struggles over interpre-
tation but is also a question of international and inner-societal con-
flicts over institutional developments, material concessions, etc. 
(Brand, 2005, p. 172)
A Regulatory Anthropology of Cooperation—
Reshaping Catastrophic Collective Risk?
As Ayers and Braithwaite (1992) argue, in modern regulatory thinking, there 
is a need to transcend debates about regulation/deregulation and about the 
limits of command.
High levels of regulation are necessary both on grounds of economic 
efficiency and risk management. Effective regulation in conditions of 
great complexity depends on fostering norms among the regulated 
such that they will voluntarily comply, and depends on the creation of 
a constant dialogue between regulators and the regulated: hence 
“responsive regulation,” the coinage for which Braithwaite is best 
known. (Moran, 2002, pp. 388-389)
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So the “smart regulation” literature answers the question of when we can 
abandon command by looking toward a “community of shared fate”—where 
poor performance on the part of one damages the prospects of all (Gunningham 
& Grabosky, 1998).
Is this reflected in the recent trend in global regulation to transcend legal 
formalism by trading in broad definitions rather than sharp rules? Where it 
is “creative opportunism” such as tax avoidance that is the focus of regula-
tion, legal formalism is undermined regularly by the creativity of strategic 
actors searching for the advantage toward self-interest. Yet an alternative 
self-regulatory approach to controlling creative, individualist advantage is 
itself undermined when
tensions in legal ideology, conflicts with legislative and regulatory 
approaches, disagreements over how to best achieve efficient control 
and at what price, vested interests, powerful lobbies against the broad 
approach all voiced in the discourse of formalism, have provided the 
first nail in the coffin of anti-formalist control. (McBarnet & Whelan, 
1991, p. 849)
The tension here is not between legal rules and creative avoidance but 
within the foment of competing self-interest ungoverned by law. The founda-
tion of the regulatory conundrum is not so much the choice between formal-
ity and compliance, intrusiveness or collaboration, but rather within the 
spirit of individual self-interest. The rational choice of the individual cre-
ative opportunist outside the general interest will undermine any and all 
regulatory strategies. The failure to recognize minimum utility in regulation 
even for self-interest removes the critique from preferred regulatory styles to 
further strategies of avoidance. It is the recognition of multiple interests 
playing out for each regulatory stakeholder that invites consideration of 
mutuality. Therefore, the key to regulatory success is the manipulation of the 
motivation for collaboration: exploiting the community of shared fate. 
Inducing cooperation in adverse individualist contexts of self-interest will 
produce at best creative compliance, which ignores the general interest spirit 
of collaborative regulation in preference for comparative advantage.
Creative compliance is stimulated by strong motivations for resisting 
control. These motivations do not disappear with the first threat of a 
different form of control. On the contrary, they become motivations for 
resisting and undermining anti-formalism. (McBarnet & Whelan, 
1991, p. 870).
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In the context of the “regulatory society” where risk is the driving force for 
regulation, a transition from self-interest to general interest may be motivated 
out of the peculiar social entities, which are “post-financial-melt-down,” 
“no-turning-back global warming” political economies.
The basis of their solidarity and sense of collective identity have been 
eroded and at the same time the substantially realistic expectations of 
their citizens as to security, well-being and improvement in their cir-
cumstances are constantly increased by the application of science and 
technology. (Clarke, 2000, p. 23)
As that faith in science and technology is wasted within crises of uncon-
trollable proportions, the triumph of self-interest over general interest in a 
growing and desperate community of shared risk will no doubt be short lived. 
The emerging age of CSR from a world of “fortress corporation” at the close 
of the last century is evidence. This transition in interest motivation will pro-
vide an impetus for collaborative regulation not known in recent postindus-
trial ages of political economy and globalization.
The suggested “science” of crisis to ordering through regulatory collabo-
ration is more suited to a political climate that sees the need for regulation as 
conflict resolution or even crisis management within a reactive and dimin-
ishing state that is limited to providing a framework within which citizens 
can pursue their chosen goals toward the general interest of cooperative sus-
tainability rather than individualized advantage. This organic regulatory 
atmosphere is contrary and often alien to more recently conceptualized 
state-driven mechanical ordering more suited to interventionist and imposed 
policy within an activist state dedicated to the “material and moral better-
ment of its citizens.”
Cotterrell (1995) in Law’s Community sees the move to a more inclu-
sive conception of regulation as requiring a new way of thinking, wherein 
regulation becomes a central cohesive force behind motivations for 
sociability.
We ought . . . to stop thinking of legal regulation primarily as some-
thing imposed on the rest of social life; and to think of it equally as 
something that might grow spontaneously out of every day conditions 
of social interaction, and might provide a part of the cement that gives 
moral meaning to social existence. (Cotterrell, 1995, p. 308)
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The pressure toward collaborative regulation in a more generalized inter-
est to ensure the sustainability of communities of shared fate cannot be sepa-
rated from an impending sense of millenarianism. As Hood suggests, 
individual choice will be regulated and constrained through group choice, 
“by binding the individual into a collective body” (Hood, 1998, p. 8).
Hood sees this as generating a simple but powerful typology of styles of 
public management: fatalist, hierarchist, individualist, and egalitarian. 
Despite the inevitability of collaboration in communities of shared risk, this 
does not tell us, beyond a greater mutuality of interest, what will be the styles, 
techniques, instruments, and languages of regulation, which will emerge. 
Interrogating sociability rather than vague notions of communities united in 
the face of catastrophe and crisis may assist in understanding the features of 
regulatory transitions to modern global ordering
Sociability—New Nonstate Relations
This analysis has considered regulatory sociability as the characteristic and 
consequence of relevant corporate self-regulation, countering the criticism of 
modern regulatory intervention as reflecting little more than politicized 
popular responses to economic crisis. In the richest, most representative and 
benign governance structures regulation abounds, charged as it is with 
obtaining and retaining the quality of life for citizens and civil society. That 
said, we need to interrogate beyond self-interest, “What makes regulation 
efficient in achieving any such political and social aspiration?”
Recognizing the reality that regulatory regimes are vulnerable to capture 
by the commercial, political, and social interests that they are set to regulate 
(Stigler, 1971), the article has revealed those foundational social bonds that 
are strained in crisis and restored in orderliness. This is the framework of 
regulatory sociability. The outcome of regulatory sociability should reflect 
culturally sensitive and contextually efficient institutional and process adap-
tations of governance to a complex and globalized world. The measure of this 
at the sharp edge is the way in which conciliatory and collaborative (not just 
responsive or reflexive) regulation moves chaos and crisis to orderliness. An 
essential precondition for sociability, and for the effectiveness of collabora-
tive regulation, is trust.
Cooperative compliance as a cause and consequence of regulatory socia-
bility entails the creation of regulatory relationships based on trust. Only 
where externalized incentives to cooperate trump the need for trust, and 
these could include legal compulsion, will these trust relationships recede 
and sociability diminish in any organic form. But in conclusion, mechanical 
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and imposed regulatory regimes of reordering crisis are unsustainable due to 
a variety of critical reasons. For crisis, particularly global, to be convinc-
ingly converted to orderliness that lasts, the following is required if sociabil-
ity is to emerge:
Regulation wherein players
 • can be taken at their word and
 • dialogue is honest between them
 • where interests are mutualized and
 • agreed rules are fair and applicable, and there is a resultant
 • preference for cooperative regularity
The aspirations for regulatory sociability are neither naïve or altruistic. 
They require rigorous analytical engagement if they are to translate from 
speculative contemplations to pressing policy agendas. Much more can be 
said about the externalization of risk to communities who do not share in the 
private (and legally endorsed) interests and protections of regulated commer-
cial environments. The need to break into that legalized, privatized domain to 
advance through pluralist regulation strong and shared notions of public 
(general) good is well recognized.21 The inducement to collaborate, not from 
any reformist acceptance of mutual as opposed to self-interest at least in the 
short term, is the organic consequence of living in communities of shared risk 
and shared fate. The fragility of cooperative compliance whether it depends 
on best practice or good corporate citizenship is the daily experience of ten-
sions in CSR. A hard look needs to be cast at the possibility of realigning 
global preferencing from economic wealth and material profit to sustainabil-
ity in all its life-forms. Finally, risk aversion and crisis reduction cannot be 
causally assumed, and orderliness is not naturally expected as a consequence 
of sociability without a very critical appreciation of the vulnerable conditions 
that create and continue any collaborative regulatory frame.
Conclusion—Corporate Governance  
Through Mutuality
The sustainability of the planet facing the avaricious resource consumption 
of the north and south worlds, and the prevarication of self-interested nation 
states, is creating a global crisis demanding much more creative and holistic 
regulatory invention and commitment. As a crisis of such imminent, inescap-
able, and invasive proportions, it also represents a test for the potential of 
regulatory sociability in collaboratively addressing communities of shared 
risk and shared fate. The challenge is sharpened by the following realities:
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 • Up until recently, those corporations that might be said to have pre-
cipitated the crisis have been actively opposed to its regulators.
 • Regulatory initiatives by nation states directed at the crisis have 
been distinctly unsuccessful.
 • Regulatory commitment as to how success might be improved has 
been divided or absent.
 • Competing knowledge bases regarding the nature and extent of the 
problem have made a unified conception of public interest problematic.
 • Public scrutiny and community activism has been sectarian, some-
times violent, and further divisive.
 • Economic self-interest has merged between commercial pollut-
ers and sensitive or corrupted political policy makers to produce a 
destructive environment of regulatory capture.
Therefore, if corporate regulatory sociability is to advance order from cri-
sis around environmental sustainability, it must
 • work from a more consolidated understanding of common good;
 • either neutralize or compromise commercial self-interest through 
repositioning the gaze of polluters and regulators from short-term 
economic profit to medium-term market and resource sustainability;
 • incorporate the polluters and the regulators, and the wider public 
interest into communities of shared risk and shared fate; and thereby
 • invigorate collaborative regulation options away from failed state 
sanction, which recognize the differential capacity of large corpora-
tions and fragmented states to negotiate common interests.
The transformation of self-interest to mutuality depends on a mix of trust 
and friendship relationships to accept a repositioning of corporate focus from 
immediate profit maximization to medium-term resource and market sustain-
ability. Trust stimulates communication and mutual understanding beyond 
prospective oppositions and antimonies. Trust relationships offer dependent 
market and community stakeholders the power to decide mutually beneficial 
outcomes within an environment where defection from such relationships is 
less likely due to the negative contingencies of defection. The productive 
capacity of trust relationships cannot be fully realized without presupposing 
conditions of corporate governance wherein the mutualist opportunities of 
trust-based relationships can be recognized and realized through collabora-
tive regulation producing sociability.
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Author’s Note
Professor Findlay is soon to publish (Palgrave MacMillan) Challenges in Regulating 
Global Crisis in which he elaborates on the central theoretical theme in this article: 
regulatory sociability.
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Notes
 1. This conclusion is based on writings about the deontological strain of liberalism. 
Individual sovereignty in the choice of personal action throws into sharp relief 
the more general libertarian rights that are to varying degrees dependent on insti-
tutional restraints and regulation; see Fried (1983, Note 3).
 2. The specific context selected to test the resilience of regulatory sociability is cri-
sis and post crisis, evidenced through chaos theory. The regulatory expectation 
and the condition for prevailing sociability is orderliness, demonstrated in the 
conditions of civil society.
 3. The modern influence of political economy theories in regulation, located within 
considerations of state reconstruction and reassertion, is well discussed in Pur-
cell (2002).
 4. These themes are introduced in the context of public choice theory and its limits 
by Sunstein (1990b).
 5. Here, we take up the analysis by Elkin (1985).
 6. As discussed and foreshadowed in Posner (2009).
 7. In the context of late capitalist political economies, responsive regulation is dis-
cussed in Braithwaite (2008).
 8. This can mean many things. Within the general conditions of political economy 
employed here, we adopt a similar appreciation of the role of the market in global 
crisis and its potentials for regulation as does Lie (1997).
 9. For an interesting discussion of chaos theory and how it has the potential to 
plot crisis (in the global catastrophe sense as it is employed in this article), see 
Thietart and Forgues (1995).
10. Interest group theory is discussed in comparison with public interest and capture 
specifically in economic regulation by Posner (1974).
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11. In employing this hegemonic concept, it is easy to recognize its slippery and 
politically malleable representation that governs exclusionist notions of standing 
and benefit within a sectarian globalized political economy—see Findlay (2008).
12. For a discussion of responsive regulation, see Ayers and Braithwaite (1992).
13. This section is informed by the thinking of Brand (2005).
14. Game theory can be used to define an optimal disclosure decision in such an 
interactive situation. It may also be used to analyze these “solution concepts” in 
general as well as in particular instances.
15. Nonlinear dynamic systems have specific properties that mathematicians have 
studied.
16. Thietart and Forgues (1995) observe chaotic systems, and their properties have 
received a considerable amount of attention in the natural sciences.
17. Trust-based regulation is depicted in Cherney (1997).
18. Braithwaite (2008) vice to virtue debate, Chapter 2.
19. Luhmann (1979) as described in Teubner (1997).
20. Comity is expanded as a regulatory parameter in Uslauner (1991).
21. For a discussion of this in the context of promoting general interests into con-
struction contracts where agreements for advancing the built environment risk 
the quality of life for noncontracting communities, see Perez (2002).
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